Banks use trading as a vehicle to take risk. Using unique high-frequency regulatory data, we estimate the sensitivity of weekly bank trading profits to aggregate equity, fixed-income, credit, currency and commodity risk factors. U.S. banks had large trading exposures to equity market risk before the Volcker Rule, which they curtailed afterwards. They also have exposures to credit and currency risk. The results hold up in a quasi-natural experimental design that exploits the phased-in introduction of reporting requirements to address identification. Timing, heterogeneity, and placebo tests further corroborate the results. Counterfactual and stress-test analyses quantify the financial stability implications.
Introduction
Trading has become an important part of the business model of the modern banking corporation.
1 With the traditional loan-centric model of banking in steady decline over the last two decades, the trading book has become the main alternative to loans along with securities holding. In the late 1990s and early 2000s, loans accounted for over 60% of aggregate total assets in the U.S. banking sector and trading assets were less than 1/10 the size of loans. By contrast, loans accounted for as little as 40% of total assets over the last decade, while securities holding was about 18%, and trading assets stood as high as 13%, totaling more than the aggregate value of tier 1 capital. Of course, the experience of the financial crisis serves as a harsh reminder that massive trading book losses can have a systemic impact. And bank trading remains at the center of the financial regulation agenda, with recent efforts underway to streamline the regulation of trading that was enacted under the broader framework of the Dodd-Frank Act (see Squam Lake Group, 2010; Greenwood et al. 2017a,b; Quarles, 2018 for the academic and policy debate on financial regulation).
Yet, despite its importance, there has been little systematic study of the trading book in banking, with the literature having focused on more traditional assets and on the liabilities side of the bank balance sheet.
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In order to fill the gap in the banking literature, we use newly-available highfrequency regulatory data on the daily trading book profits and losses of U.S. banks.
1 Several recent reports by government agencies and central banks have been devoted to the bank trading book. For example, the Federal Reserve Board's Iercosan et al. (2017a,b,c) examine trading activities at U.S. systemically important banks post crisis. The BIS published a policy paper in 2013 on the Basel Committee's fundamental review of trading book capital requirements (https://www.bis.org/publ/bcbs265.pdf). And the ECB has recently increased scrutiny of the trading book of the euro zone's biggest lenders reportedly due to financial stability concerns (Bloomberg Business, June 13, 2018) .
2 For recent exceptions, see Hanson, Shleifer, Stein, and Vishny (2015) and recent work by Minton, Stulz, and Taboada (2017) , who conjecture that trading assets can explain important features of bank valuation, such as the cross-sectional negative relation between bank valuation and size. Outside of banking, an influential intermediary-based asset pricing literature emphasizes the central role of banks as marginal investors to explain risk premiums in asset markets (see He and Krishnamurthy (2018) for a survey).
Trading is a powerful instrument for hedging risk, but it also allows banks to quickly and cheaply take speculative risk. If banks use trading to increase risk, then individual banks may be vulnerable to potentially large losses.
3 If all banks take similar positions, the entire banking sector may be vulnerable. To determine the risk exposures of banks via trading, we build on the standard approach in banking (Flannery and James (1984) , Gorton and Rosen (1995) ) and infer the direction of trading from bank trading profits. We estimate the sensitivity of banks' net trading profits to a broad array of aggregate risk factors, including equity markets and interest rates.
We use our estimates to empirically address two main questions: first, does trading increase or decrease systemic risk in the U.S. banking sector, in the sense of exposure to aggregate risk factors? Second, is government regulation of bank trading effective at curtailing risk?
At In 2018, regulators put out for comments proposed revisions intended to streamline implementation and compliance of the rule, which have been actively debated in the press.
We estimate the sensitivity of U.S. banks' net trading profits to an array of aggregate risk factors, which are broadly representative of the asset classes bank trading portfolios are invested in and include seven main risk factors for equities, interest rates, credit, foreign exchange, and commodities. 4 We use this approach to document a number of stylized facts on the evolution of bank risk taking via their trading books in the post-crisis period. First, U.S. banks' trading books had large exposures to equity market risk before the Volcker Rule was finalized, which they fully curtailed afterwards. Pre-rule equity risk exposures were not limited to equity desks, but were large and significant across the board of the main asset classes, including fixed-income.
The decline in trading book value when the stock market declines was economically large: a one standard deviation negative realization of the S&P return, which corresponds to a 2 percentage points drop, would have generated a 14 percentage point trading loss relative to the Value-at-Risk (VaR). This loss is of the same order of magnitude as the banks' average net profits relative to VaR in the sample and about half of its standard deviation. A stress-test calibration indicates that, pre-regulation, a 5% drop in stock market returns would have led to large aggregate losses, up to about 3% (1.5%) of the banking sector's market risk weighted assets (tier 1 common equity capital).
Second, the evidence is more nuanced for interest rate and credit risk. While there is evidence at the desk level that banks cut back on their interest rate exposures of their portfolios of government and fixed-income securities, exposures to credit risk do 4 Our bank-level sample includes 2,913 bank-week observations for 13 unique U.S. banks for which we have complete information on trading profits at the bank level between January 2013 and June 2017. We complement the bank-level analysis with a trading desk-level analysis for a sample of 20 unique U.S. banks over the same period for which we have complete information on trading profits at the more disaggregated desk-asset class level. Coverage of both samples is comprehensive. The 13 banks in the bank-level sample cover about 90% of aggregate trading assets in the U.S. banking sectors, while the 20 banks of the trading-desk sample cover virtually the universe of the U.S. banking sector's trading assets.
4 not appear to have been affected by the rule. Third, there is evidence of exposure to currency risk, with the dollar risk factor significant especially in commodity trading desks, in line with certain commodities and foreign exchange or currency trading being exempted from the rule. The economic significance of both credit and dollar risk exposures is much smaller compared to the pre-rule exposure to equity market risk, with a one standard deviation change in the credit (dollar) risk factor leading to a 5 (3) percentage point change in trading profits. In all, rather than hedge aggregate exposures, the bank trading book tended to also bet on rising stock markets prerule, and continued to load, though to a lesser extent, on credit risk and the dollar throughout the rest of the sample period.
We corroborate the effect of Volcker on equity market risk with a battery of additional tests that address two main issues with our baseline analysis, rebalancing and identification. First, the effect is robust to addressing rebalancing by using an optimal changepoint regression technique to estimate time-varying risk exposures and a statistical test for structural breaks in banks' equity market risk exposures similar to Bollen and Whaley (2009) . Second, the effect is also robust to using a differences-indifferences (DD) research design that refines identification by exploiting the staggered timing of the rule's reporting requirement, which was phased in over a period of two and half years. This design addresses potential contemporaneous confounds that are common across banks by deriving estimates for each bank relative to a control group of other banks that were not yet subject to reporting. Third, the effect also holds up to falsification and heterogeneity tests. When we add controls for other regulations, the effect does not appear to be driven by banks that were subjected to new or enhanced capital and liquidity requirements or banks that failed an annual stress test. Finally, it holds across the board of our cross-section of banks, with no evidence of heterogeneity by bank or trading book size, all suggesting that our estimates isolate an independent effect of Volcker.
The additional tests are also helpful to interpret the results on credit and currency 5 risk. Credit risk exposures in the post-Volcker period are driven by large banks and those that failed the stress tests. To the extent that these banks faced the blunt of the compression in profits from heightened regulation and the low-rate environment, their continued credit-risk exposure is in line with existing evidence of reach-foryield incentives of financial institutions in the post-crisis period (see, for example, Becker and Ivashina (2015) , Di Maggio and Kacperczyk (2015) ). Interestingly, the evidence indicates that reporting increased exposure to the dollar, consistent with a migration effect toward asset classes that were exempted from the rule. Collectively, our evidence indicates that, while banning proprietary trading is an effective financial stability tool to curtail large exposures, it is not a panacea, as reducing smaller exposures may require different, more targeted tools.
In summary, our primary contribution is to document the first comprehensive evidence on the risks that banks take in their trading. Our evidence is complementary to the existing banking literature starting with Flannery and James (1984) and Gorton and Rosen (1995) , which has so far examined primarily interest rate risk exposures for measures of overall bank performance (for recent examples, see Drechsler, Savov, and Schnabl (2018) , English, Van den Heuvel, and Zakrajsek (2018), Begenau, Piazzesi, and Schneider (2015) , and Landier, Sraer, and Thesmar (2013) ). By focusing on the performance of banks' trading books, we isolate the contribution of trading to the overall risk profile of U.S. banks -i.e., whether trading increases or decreases systemic risk in the U.S. banking sector -and how it has evolved over time since the crisis.
5 By doing so, we join a growing literature that centers around the balance-sheet positions and risks of financial institutions, either to document their properties empirically (see, for example, Adrian and Shin (2011) , who examine Value-at-Risk measures of investment banks, and Bai, Krishnamurthy, and Weymuller (2018) , who focus on measuring liquidity risk) or to build theoretical models (see He and Krishnamurthy (2018) for a survey). Our evidence has implications for the broader debate on whether U.S. banks have gotten safer since the crisis, which is a contentious question because, among other reasons, it is challenging to measure the riskiness of U.S. banks (see Gandhi and Lustig (2015) and Atkeson, Eisfeldt, d'Avernas, and Weill (2018) for recent related approaches that use banks' stock returns to measure their riskiness).
In addition, we contribute to the ongoing academic debate on the effectiveness of financial regulation. Agarwal, Lucca, Seru and Trebbi (2014) and Granja and Leuz (2017) exploit well-identified settings to evaluate the effectiveness of surpervision.
Their evidence indicates that the regulators who are entrusted with enforcing financial regulations matter for regulatory outcomes, pointing to a tension betweeen rules and inconsistent enforcement by multiple regulators that hinders their effectivess.
While the institutional features of the Volcker Rule make our setting different from this prior work, as enforcement of the rule is not decentralized and only tasked to federal agencies, our evidence that the reporting requirement matters corroborates the broader conclusion of the literature that enforcement matters. Our analysis of the reporting requirement speaks to the heated debate on the consequences of recent efforts to streamline the post-crisis regulations of banks without compromising the safety and soundness of the U.S. financial system (Greenwood et al. (2017b) and Quarles (2018) ).
Our approach is also complementary to the recent literature that has sought to assess the Volcker Rule by focusing on changes in market liquidity. Duffie (2012) argues that the rule reduces the ability of banks to provide market-making services, which in turn adversely affects market liquidity in dealer-intermediated markets. Bao et al. (2016) show supporting evidence that the price impact of trades in downgraded corporate bonds increased after the rule. 6 By focusing directly on banks we sharpen identification, because we can directly control for concurrent regulatory changes and exploit the staggered introduction of the reporting requirements, thus isolating, to 6 Allahrakha et al. (2018) find that transaction costs for corporate bond investors also increased. Anderson and Stulz (2017) point out that the dealers affected by the Volcker Rule were also affected by the concurrent implementation of Basel III and attribute changes in market liquidity to other regulatory reforms. Other studies find mixed to no evidence of changes in market liquidity after the crisis (Trebbi and Xiao (2017) , Paddrik and Tompaidis (2018) ). the best of our knowledge for the first time, the causal effect of the rule on bank risk taking.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides an institutional background. Section 3 describes our data and research design. Section 4 presents our main empirical results at the "top-of-the-house" (bank) as well as at the "sub-portfolio" (desk) level. Section 5 presents the results of our falsification and differences-in-differences tests that address identification. Section 6 concludes. 
Data and Research Design
We use newly-available regulatory reporting data collected by the Federal Reserve to monitor compliance with the U.S. Market Risk Capital Rule, which implements the market risk related provisions of the Basel III revised capital framework in the U.S. (Federal Register, 2012) . Among other things, this rule stipulates that banks with trading assets and liabilities of at least $1.0 billion or 10 percent of their total assets must divide its trading book portfolio into subportfolios and calculate, for each subportfolio, (1) daily Value-at-Risk (VaR) calibrated to a one-tail 99% confidence level and (2) daily profit or loss (P/L) for its portfolio, that is, the net change in the value of the positions held in the subportfolio at the end of the previous business day ( §205). Although this measure of P/L generally underestimates total profits, as banks also typically earn fees and commissions from their market making and business on behalf of customers in addition to any capital gains or losses associated with their trading book positions, it is more suitable for identifying portfolio risk exposures from bank trading.
Starting from January 2013, the effective date of the Market Risk Capital Rule, 30 U.S. bank holding companies (BHCs) and intermediate holding companies (IHCs) report sub-portfolio risk metrics to the Federal Reserve. Given our focus on U.S. banks, we keep only domestic BHCs, which leads to a sample of 20 BHCs for which we have full reported information at the desk-asset class, or "sub-portfolio," level over the entire January 2013 to June 2017 period. For 13 of these BHCs we also have full reported information at the more aggregate bank level, or "top-of-the-house," over the period. To err on the side of caution, we opted for not including the remaining 7 BHCs in the bank-level sample because it is problematic to aggregate the desk-level VaRs into the top-of-the-house VaRs as it is well-known that VaRs are not generally additive (Artzner et al., 1999) .
Coverage of our two main samples is comprehensive. The 13 banks in the banklevel sample cover about 90% of aggregate trading assets in the U.S. banking sectors, while the 20 banks of the trading-desk sample cover virtually the universe of the U.S. banking sector's trading assets. The 13 firms in our bank-level sample include all U.S. Globally Systemically Important Banks (GSIBs) and collectively hold between $6.3 and $7.2 trillion in risk-weighted assets, which is a large fraction of the total risk-weighted assets held by U.S. banks. The banks account for an even larger share of trading assets and liabilities, holding $1.5-$1.8 trillion in trading assets and $625-$760 billion in trading liabilities during our sample period. The remaining 7 banks, which did not report consistently at the bank-level, are generally small in terms of their trading activity. Their inclusion in the desk-level analysis of Section 4.2 serves as a robustness check. Table 1 , Panel A, reports some summary statistics for the P/L data at the top-ofthe-house level. Although the raw data are available daily, we do our analysis at the weekly frequency to mitigate the effect of high-frequency noise. For confidentiality reasons, we cannot present firm-specific statistics, so we report cross-sectional statistics for banks' time-series mean, minimum, and maximum weekly P/L. The average 
Measuring trading book performance
Our primary outcome of interest is trading book profits. To estimate exposures, we scale trading profits by Value-at-Risk (VaR), which is an important part of the total trading-book regulatory capital (Federal Register, 2012, §204) . Specifically, we construct our main measure of scaled trading profits by dividing the weekly P/L by the average daily VaR within the week multiplied by the number of trading days in that week and subtracting the risk-free rate:
where P/L it is the sum of daily P/L of bank i in week t, n t is the number of trading days in week t, and V aR i,t is the average daily VaR of bank i in week t; scaling by √ n t approximately translates a daily VaR into a weekly VaR.
The intuition behind this measure is that weekly trading-book returns are defined as the weekly P/L divided by the amount of capital committed to the trading business of each bank at the beginning of the week. We use VaR to proxy for committed capital because the latter is not available at this level of granularity and frequency.
In robustness analysis we also consider an alternative measure of scaled trading profits that proxies for capital committed to trading using the product of each bank's market capitalization times the proportion of trading-book risk-weighted asses (RWA):
where mRW A it denotes market risk-weighted assets, RW A it total risk-weighted assets, and mE it is the beginning-of-the-week market value of equity. The clear drawback of this measure is that data on RW A are only available at a quarterly frequency.
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Thus, we set the within quarter RW A equal to the beginning of quarter RW A. The RW A data are obtained from the FR-Y9C regulatory filings.
8 Table 2 reports some descriptive statistics for the weekly trading-book returns for each firm in our baseline sample. The mean returns tend to be close to zero with standard deviations between 0.3 and 0.5%. The minimum weekly returns range from -0.75% to -2.74% and the maximum weekly return from 0.60% to 2.93%. Similar to the raw P/L, the weekly return distributions are asymmetric and exhibit fat tails. Table 3 reports descriptive statistics for our weekly risk factors, which are meant to measure risk by the main broad asset classes banks trade in, equities, fixed-income and credit, commodities, and foreign exchange. Our market risk factor (MKT) is the weekly excess return on the value-weighted market portfolio obtained from Kenneth
Risk factors
French's website. Our volatility risk factor (VIX) is the weekly change in the CBOE VIX index. Our interest rate risk factor (IR5Y) is the weekly change in the 5-year swap rate. Our credit risk factor (DEF) is the weekly change in the credit spread, which is defined as the difference between a 10-year BBB-rated bond yield and the 10-year Treasury yield. Our slope-of-the-yield-curve risk factor (TERM) is the weekly changes in the term spread, which is defined as the difference between the 10-year and 1-year Treasury yields. Finally, our commodity and foreign exchange risk factors are the weekly return on the Goldman Sachs Commodity Index (GSCI) and the weekly excess return on the dollar factor (DOL) introduced by Lustig et al. (2011), respectively; a positive excess return on DOL indicates US dollar depreciation. Except for the Treasury yields, which are obtained from the Federal Reserve, all the other data are from Bloomberg.
Research design
We assess banks' trading risk exposures following a standard approach in banking since Flannery and James (1984) and Gorton and Rosen (1995) ): how sensitive is the trading book performance of a given bank to a broad array of aggregate risk factors, including equity markets and interest rates? To that end, we examine the following main relation:
where the outcome variable, r it , for bank i in week t is the trading book return defined in Section 3.1, and the main variable of interest, RF t , is the vector of the seven risk factors (MKT, VIX, IR5Y, DEF, TERM, GSCI, and DOL) defined in 3.2. Recall that MKT and GSCI are excess returns on the market portfolio and a commodity portfolio, respectively, and we expect a positive beta if banks' trading books are exposed to these risk factors. DOL is an excess return in USD of a basket of foreign currencies, and hence an exposure of a trading book to US dollar depreciation implies a negative DOL beta. The other risk factors-VIX, IR5Y, DEF, and TERM-are changes in implied volatility, interest rates, default risk, and the slope of the yield curve, respectively, so a positive exposure to these risk factors is associated with a negative beta. To address unobserved heterogeneity, in all specifications we control for bank fixed effects by including a full set of bank-specific dummies, λ i . The inclusion of bank effects ensures that the parameter of interest, β, which represents the risk exposures, is estimated only from within-bank time-series variation. We conduct statistical inference using the Driscoll and Kraay (1998) standard errors which are robust to heteroskedasticity, serial correlation, and cross-sectional dependence.
To examine whether the risk exposures changed with the introduction of the Volcker Rule, we enrich the specification in equation (1) as follows: We address the main endogeneity challenge with a causal interpretation of estimates of γ, which is that contemporaneous aggregate shocks are a potential confound that may be erroneously picked up by the simple pre-vs. post-Volcker time difference, in two ways. An important type of such shocks that are common across banks is other regulatory changes. First, we estimate a richer version of equation (2) to test whether our main estimates of γ hold up to falsification and heterogeneity tests. Specifically, we exploit our relatively high-frequency data for a broad cross section of banks to add controls for and interactions with other regulatory changes that happen within our sample period and are common across different groups of banks. Estimating γ independently even after we add these controls is feasible in our setting because other regulations, such as new or enhanced capital and liquidity requirements or the results of annual stress tests, affect different sub-groups of our banks at different times within our sample period.
Second, we recognize that adding controls for other regulations helps to ameliorate but does not fully resolve the challenge of latent common shocks because, for example, these shocks may be due to common changes in the macroeconomic environment or demand conditions in securities markets, which are challenging to control for. The ideal natural experiment would randomly assign similar types of banks to the two different types of Volcker treatment status. We exploit the staggered timing of the rule's reporting requirements to design a "quasi-natural" experiment that is geared toward generating this random assignment. As we discussed in the previous section, 
Bank trading risk exposures and Volcker
In this section, we present our main stylized facts on the evolution of bank risk taking via their trading books in the post-crisis period. After documenting trading books' exposures at the bank level, we examine more closely the sources of risk at the trading desk level. This finer analysis allows us to pin down which asset classes are exposed to which risks. To offer additional insight on the economic magnitude of the risk exposures and gauge the implications for financial stability, we use our estimates in a regression-based counterfactual exercise similar to the "stress test" commonly implemented by regulators.
Bank-level analysis
In Table 4 , we summarize results from estimating equation (1) (Table   2 ). Thus, the economic significance of credit and dollar risk exposures is relatively small, with a one standard deviation change in the credit (dollar) risk factor leading to about 1/6 (1/10) of a standard deviation change in trading profits. First, the coefficient on the interaction term of the equity market portfolio factor and the Volcker indicator is negative and statistically significant, while the coefficient on the non-interacted factor is positive and significant, indicating that U.S. banks' trading books had significant exposures to equity market risk before the Volcker Rule was finalized, which they curtailed afterwards. The two coefficient estimates have roughly the same size, in line with the result of no significant equity market exposure on average for the overall period, indicating that the pre-Vocker exposures were fully offset post-Volcker. The estimates for the pre-Volcker period imply an economically large decline in trading book value when the stock market declines: a one standard deviation negative realization of the S&P return, which corresponds to a 2 percentage points drop, would have generated a 14 percentage point trading loss relative to the Value-at-Risk (VaR). This loss is of the same order of magnitude as the banks' average net profits relative to VaR in the sample and about half of its standard deviation.
Second, there is weaker evidence of pre-Volcker exposure to equity market volatility (VIX) and interest rate (TERM) risk, which we revisit in the desk-level analysis.
Tables 6 and 7 examine in more detail the financial stability implications of the Volcker rule. The term "financial stability" is broad and has been used in the literature for many different kinds of market vulnerabilities. Based on our bank-level estimates, the effectiveness of Volcker as a financial stability tool can be evaluated by the extent to which it reduced pro-cyclicality of bank trading profits by reducing exposure to equity market returns. The extent to which pre-Volcker exposures hindered financial stability depends both on the estimated sensitivity to the equity risk factor and the size of the bank trading books. We use a counterfactual scenario to quantify the aggregate consequences of Volcker. Specifically, we report the results of a stress-test exercise that consists in calculating an aggregate counterfactual for the effect on sector-wide losses as a percentage of aggregate market risk weighted assets (RWA) or common equity tier 1 capital (CET1) for several alternative adverse scenarios that vary by the size of the shock to the equity market return (5% vs. 10%
vs. 20% for weekly losses in Table 6 , and 5% vs. 30% vs. 65% for annual losses in Table 7 ). For the calculation, we use the estimated pre-Volcker exposure in Table 5 .
Even a 5% drop in stock market returns would have led to large aggregate annual losses, up to about 3% (1.5%) of the banking sector's market risk weighted assets (tier 1 common equity capital). Losses are outsized at about 40% (20%) of the banking sector's market risk weighted assets (tier 1 common equity capital) for a 65% stock market drop, which mimics the "severely adverse scenario" of the annual regulatory stress tests (FRB, 2018b), indicating that Volcker had economically large financial stability benefits.
Desk-level analysis
Next, we examine more closely the sources of risk by repeating the analysis at the desk level. The Market Risk Capital Rule requires banks to divide their portfolios into a number of subportfolios, which have to be granular enough to allow the supervising agency to assess the adequacy of the VaR models used by the banks to satisfy marketrisk capital requirements (Federal Register, 2012) . For each of their subportfolios, banks have to report the daily P/L and VaR calibrated to a one-tail 99% confidence level for each business day over the previous two years. In addition to these metrics, our data also identify the types of assets that comprise each subportfolio. The different asset types that comprise each broad asset class are listed in the first column of Table   8 , where we report the number of subportfolios in our sample by asset class. For each asset class, we calculate the total number of subportfolios containing assets within this class (first row) and the number of subportfolios that also contain a specific asset type (subsequent rows). For example, there are 246 subportfolios that contain equities and out of these subportfolios, 88 also contain sovereign bonds, 97 also contain corporate bonds, and so on. In brackets, we report the total number of subportfolios within each asset class that only contain assets within this class and no other asset types.
For example, there are 26 subportfolios that include no asset type other than equities.
By way of additional descriptive statistics, Table 9 reports the total Value-at-Risk ($ million) at the desk level by asset class. class, equities, rates, government, credit, securities, forex, and commodities, in turn.
First, both for the equities desks and across the board of other asset classes including fixed-income, we confirm our earlier findings that the coefficient on the interaction term of equity market portfolio factor and the Volcker indicator is negative and sta-tistically significant, while the coefficient on the non-interacted factor is positive and significant, suggesting that the sources of equity risk exposure pre-Volcker were not limited to equity desks. Second, there is evidence at the equities and fixed-income desks' level that banks also cut back on their interest rate exposures, with a positive and significant coefficient on the interaction term of the interest rate risk factor (TERM) and the Volcker indicator and a negative and significant coefficient on the non-interacted factor.
Finally, we repeat both our analysis at the bank and desk level to address rebalancing by using an optimal changepoint regression technique to estimate time-varying risk exposures. If banks rebalanced their portfolios at some point in our sample period irrespective of the Volcker rule, our OLS regression with the Volcker indicator may erroneously attribute the structural change to the effect of Volcker. The optimal changepoint technique treats the precise timing of the structural change as unknown and thus serves as a useful robustness check. 9 The additional benefit of this approach is that we can implement a statistical test for structural breakes in banks' and desks' equity market risk exposures similar to Bollen and Whaley (2009) , who show that the optimal changepoint method is superior to a stochastic parameter model in detecting time-varying exposures. The results are reported in Figure 3 , which plots the cumulative frequencies of banks (right axis) and trading desks (left axis) that experience a significant structural break in their equity market beta in any given quarter over our sample period. In line with our OLS results, about half (40%) of the banks (desks) experienced a break in equity risk exposure in the quarters after the rule became 9 Our implementation of the changepoint regression closely follows Bollen and Whaley (2009). In particular, for each portfolio and each π, 0 < π < 1, we run the regressions r it = α 0i + β i0 RF t + it , t = 1, ..., πT, r it = α 0i + α 1i + (β 0i + β 1i )RF t + it , t = πT + 1, ..., T, and calculate the F-statistic, F (π), for the null hypothesis that α 1i = β 1i = 0. The test for a structural break at an unknown date is then based on the average F-statistic, π F (π). Following Bollen and Whaley (2009), we approximate the critical values for this statistic by bootstrap and estimate the date of the structural break by minimizing (over π) the sum of squared residuals in the model above.
effective in April 2014 and before full compliance was required in July 2015, and over 80% (70%) of the banks (desks) experienced a break within a quarter after the full compliance date.
Refining identification
The challenge with interpreting the baseline OLS estimates of the effect of Volcker on equity market risk is to distinguish the effect of the rule from the other broad aggregate shocks that happened over the post-crisis period, especially the new regulations that were rolled out and changes in the macroeconomic environment and financial markets.
This section builds confidence on the internal validity of the effect of Volcker on equity market risk and bolsters a causal interpretation using heterogeneity tests and a quasiexperiment. First, we consider heterogeneity tests that explicitly control and allow for variation of the effect with other regulatory changes that happened over our sample period as well as with bank size. Second, we exploit the phased-in introduction of the Volcker Rule's reporting requirements to implement a quasi-natural differencesin-differences (DD) experimental design.
Controlling for other regulations
The Volcker Rule was part of the broader regulatory overhaul of banks in the aftermath of the financial crisis. Capital requirements were strengthened, new liquidity requirements introduced, and annual stress tests conducted. Some of these new regulations were enacted or phased in during our sample period. The Supplementary Leverage Ratio (SLR), which serves as a backstop to risk-based capital requirements, became effective in January 2018, but public disclosure requirements related to SLR were mandatory from January 2015 and all U.S. banks subject to the SLR were compliant with the rule during this period. The Liquidity Coverage Ratio (LCR), which requires banks to hold a sufficient amount of liquid assets to be able to withstand a significant outflow of deposits, is being phased in and as of January 2015 the threshold was set to 80% of the final liquidity requirement.
A concern with attributing the change over time in equity exposures to Volcker is that these other regulations may have also impacted the way banks conduct their trading activities, for example, by increasing the balance sheet cost of market making (Duffie, 2016 , Adrian et al., 2017 . Additionally, some banks failed the Comprehensive
Capital Analysis and Review (CCAR) -an annual stress test conducted by the Federal
Reserve since 2011 -during our sample period, which may have impacted their ability and willingness to engage in market making and risk taking. To examine whether the Volcker effect on equity risk exposures can be explained by other regulations, we enrich our baseline specification in equation (1) as follows: Vocker is larger for any particular subset of banks that are subject to other regulations.
If this were the case, it would spell doubt on attributing the effect to Volcker. As such, the key coefficients of interest are α d and δ, and the falsification test is whether these coefficient estimates are statistically significant. In all, these findings indicate that our main result on the change in equity exposures holds up to the falsification and heterogeneity tests, because the effect does not appear to be driven by banks that either were subjected to new or enhanced capital and liquidity requirements or failed annual stress tests. And it holds across the board of our cross-section of banks, with no evidence of heterogeneity by bank or trading book size, all suggesting that our estimates isolate an independent effect of Volcker. The analysis is also helpful to interpret our earlier finding of an overall credit risk exposure over the post-crisis period in Table 4 , as it suggests that credit risk exposure in the post-Volcker period is driven by large banks and those that failed the stress tests. To the extent that these banks faced the blunt of the compression in 24 profits from heightened regulation and the low-rate environment, their continued long credit-risk exposure is in line with existing evidence of reach-for-yield incentives of financial institutions in the post-crisis period (see, for example, Becker and Ivashina (2015), Di Maggio and Kacperczyk (2015)).
Analysis of the reporting requirement
In our final analysis, we exploit the staggered phase-in of the Volcker Rule's reporting requirement to implement a quasi-experimental differences-in-differences (DD) design.
In addition to compliance, the rule also included a requirement that banks report of the rule, we estimate the following differences-in-differences (DD) specification:
where I m it is the "metrics indicator" that takes the value of one if bank i has to report metrics at time t, and equals zero otherwise. The key difference between this design and our baseline equation (2) is that we can now exploit quasi-random variation around the arbitrary size thresholds of the reporting requirement to estimate the change in exposures over time for any given bank as the within-bank effect relative to a control group of other banks that were relatively similar and also subject to compliance with Volcker but that were not yet subject to reporting. Using these banks as a control group addresses potential contemporaneous confounds that are common across banks over our sample period. To address unobserved heterogeneity, we include bank fixed effects, λ i , and again conduct statistical inference using the Driscoll and Kraay (1998) standard errors which are robust to heteroskedasticity, serial correlation, and cross-sectional dependence. The coefficient of interest is γ, which represents the effect of the treatment on the treated -i.e., the change in exposures after the Volcker reporting requirement is phased in relative to the control group of other banks that are not subject to the requirement. Table 13 summarizes results from estimating equation (4) at the bank level with trading performance (P/L) normalized by VaR as the outcome variable. In line with our baseline findings, the coefficient estimate for the interaction term of the reporting indicator and the equity market factor is negative and statistically significant, while the coefficient on the non-interacted factor is positive and significant, indicating that the reporting requirement reduced U.S. banks' trading book exposures to equity market risk. While smaller than our baseline estimate in Table 5 , the estimate for the reduction in equity market risk exposures when banks are subject to the reporting requirement remains economically large. The estimate of -4.437 implies that a one standard deviation negative realization of the S&P return would have generated about 9 percentage point smaller trading loss relative to the Value-at-Risk (VaR) as a consequence of the requirement. This loss is of the same order of magnitude as the pre-Volcker exposures. Second, relative to the baseline analysis there is stronger evidence of an economically significant reduction in exposures to equity market volatility (VIX) risk. The estimate of -0.028 implies that a one standard deviation increase in the VIX would have generated about 7.5 percentage point smaller trading gains relative to the Value-at-Risk (VaR) as a consequence of the requirement. Finally, there is evidence that the requirement increased exposure to the dollar, consistent with a risk migration toward asset classes that were exempted from the rule.
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Conclusion
The bank trading book has attracted increasing attention in the wake of the 2008-09 financial crisis and the ensuing new regulatory landscape for banks. In order to better understand the sources of risk that emanate from the trading book and, more broadly, whether banks use trading as a vehicle for adding risk, we have used novel regulatory data on bank trading profits and a transparent measurement approach to assess risk exposures. We have documented several stylized facts on the evolution of bank risk taking via their trading books in the post-crisis period, including robust evidence that U.S. banks had large trading exposures to equity market risk before the introduction of the Volcker Rule in 2014 and that they curtailed these exposures afterwards. The approach developed in this paper offers a first step toward assessing risk for the modern banking corporation, which had not yet been the subject of systematic empirical testing despite the growth of the bank trading book. There are several venues along which our approach can be extended.
First, we took a step in the direction of measuring risk exposures, but clearly more can be done to extend the framework for policy evaluation of alternative financial stability tools. It would be particularly interesting to integrate the loan book in the analysis and examine the interplay between exposures across different bank activities as highlighted, for example, in the model of Froot and Stein (1998) . Second, it would be interesting to study risk exposures in a more explicit structural setting, which would allow for a more quantitative evaluation of policy counterfactuals such as the stress testing scenarios that regulators use for banks. Third, our high-frequency data and approach could be extended to study in more detail the link between bank trading, financial regulation, and several documented pricing anomalies and deviations from arbitrage in forex and fixed-income markets. Finally, extending the analysis to an international setting by examining risk exposures of intermediate holding companies (IHCs) would allow for an analysis of the effect of foreign regulations and help to understand the extent to which they interact with domestic ones. Tables   Table 1: This table presents cross-sectional summary statistics for weekly dollar profits/losses (P/L) and weekly dollar Value-at-Risk (VaR) at the top-of-the-house level for our 13 banks 1/2013 -6/2017. For each bank, we first calculate the time-series mean, standard deviation, minimum, and maximum, and report in the table the cross-sectional averages (column 1), minima (column 2), maxima (column 3), skewness (column 4), and excess kurtosis (column 5) for these statistics. Table 3 : This table reports summary statistics for our weekly risk factor returns/changes 1/2013 -6/2017. MKT denotes the market return, VIX is the change in CBOE implied volatility index, IR5Y is the change in the five-year swap rate, TERM is the change in the term spread, which is defined as the difference between the 10-year and 1-year US Treasury zero coupon yield, DEF is the change in the default factor, which is defined as the difference between a 10-year BBB-rated corporate bond and the 10-year Treasury yield, SPGSCI is the return on the S&P GSCI commodity index, and DOL is the return on the Lusting et al. (2011) Driscoll and Kraay (1998) standard errors, which are robust to heteroskedasticity, serial correlation, and crosssectional dependence are reported in parentheses. Levels of significance are indicated by *, **, and *** for 10%, 5%, and 1% respectively.
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(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) Table 6 : This table reports the reduction in weekly predicted losses post-Volcker in response to a shock to the market portfolio (MKT). Based on our estimates of the change in the sensitivity to the market portfolio post-Volcker reported in Table 5 , we calculate the predicted change in the P/L normalized by VaR and then multiply this change by the Mean VaR (top panel) or Maximum VaR (bottom panel) to obtain the decline in dollar losses associated with the market shock. We also report the losses expressed as a percentage of market risk weighted assets (RWA) or common equity Tier 1 capital (CET1). 43% 30% 32,708.58 30.75 9,142.45 5.07% 3.67% 19.7% 3.54% 0.17% 8.57% 65% 70,868.58 66.62 19,808.65 11.0% 7.96% 41.9% 7.68% 0.36% 18.6% Table 8 : This table reports the number of subportfolios in our sample by asset class. For each asset class, we calculate the total number of subportfolios containing assets within this class (first row) and the number of subportfolios that also contain a specific asset type (subsequent rows). For example, there are 246 subportfolios that contain equities and out of these subportfolios, 88 also contain sovereign bonds, 97 also contain corporate bonds, and so on. In brackets, we report the total number of subportfolios within each asset class that only contain assets within this class and no other asset types. For example, there are 26 subportfolios that include no asset type other than equities.
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